

ER 8-4540

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14 JUL 1956

*and*  
Mr. D. Milton Ladd  
Commission on Government Security  
441 G Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mickey:

I am returning the transcript of my talk before the Commission on 16 June 1956 which you so kindly sent me. As you will note, I have made several corrections and would appreciate these changes being incorporated in the other copies.

I believe [ ] spoke to you about classification. Since my talk by and large was based on information taken from classified documents of this agency, I have classified the attached copy SECRET and request that you similarly classify the other copies you have on hand.

It was a great pleasure to meet with the members of the Commission. Please do not hesitate to call on me if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

SENT

Allen M. Dulles  
Director

*Confidential*

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P R O C E E D I N G S

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: I thought it would be well if Mr. Dulles spoke to us as he spoke at the University of Pennsylvania the other day, and gave us the inside viewpoint of his department. He has agreed that we may have it written up except when he goes off the record, and I would like if it is agreeable to the Commission to ask the staff to come in because they are awfully anxious to hear Mr. Dulles.

I am awfully appreciative, Mr. Dulles, of your coming. You have been kind enough to hold up departure for the west today.

MR. DULLES: You are very lucky to have this man, Mickey Ladd, as we call him.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: We are, too. Mr. Dulles, we would appreciate anything you can tell us that might be of assistance in our labors.

MR. DULLES: Mr. Chairman, the problem of security is certainly one of the most difficult and one of the most important that the government faces. In a sensitive agency like the one I have the honor to head, it is of absolutely primary importance. If Congress in its wisdom, and I think it was very wise in acting as it did, has given me rather special authority to handle security matters and security cases so that I can hire and fire in my uncontrolled discretion. That, however, is a discretion that must be used with great care. I try to follow the general procedures prescribed under 10450, and the other applicable rules and try to insure that those of my employees have a fair and full hearing, even though there may, in my opinion, be reasons for their severance from the Agency.

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I understand today you are not interested in my particular problems as much as in the situation of the Soviet Union today in this general field. That is to say, what is the Soviet Union doing? Does the so-called new look affect in any way the security problem which the Soviet Union poses?

It is our clear view, and we think we can document it, that the ultimate objective of the Soviet Union has not in any respect changed since the death of Stalin. Their techniques have changed to some extent. There are new faces in the Kremlin, although a majority of the old faces who were responsible for all the past are still there.

Furthermore, it is our clear judgment, and I think it is shared by Mr. Hoover -- although I do not wish to quote him -- that there has been no let up in the covert penetration of the Soviet which they are endeavoring to carry out. In fact, if anything, we would rather be inclined to feel that it has been stepped up a little. As they have for the time being abandoned what you might call the old hard tactics of Stalin, that is, more or less overt aggression of the Korean, Greek, Berlin type, they are resorting more to other methods, including covert penetration and covert activities. If you had time to read the proceedings of the 20th Party Congress, and I admit I have not read it all, because it runs into millions of words, you would find tucked away there a clear statement of their objectives. Not all of them, probably, but a good many of them.

What are the techniques that they are following at the present time? They are emphasizing coexistence, desire for peace, desire for disarmament. That is the facade under which they work. Behind that, they are carrying out their new program of economic penetration. The tactics they are employing in countries like Egypt, India, and even in this hemisphere in the Argentine, on the economic side, their tactics are known to you.

Then on the covert side in the long speech that Mikoyan, who is one of the smartest men in the Kremlin, gave, he came out perfectly clearly and stated that one of the objectives of the Soviet Union should be to penetrate the parliamentary governments wherever the Soviet had a chance to do it, and try to turn any governments where they had a foothold into what they called peoples' decocracies.

Fortunately, in this country we have no real penetration of our system of government. You haven't any Communists in the Congress, thank goodness.

SENATOR COTTON: Are you sure?

MR. DULLES: We had one at one time that came from my city.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: We have had two.

MR. DULLES: Not any more.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: No, not that I know of.

MR. DULLES: So they have operated in this country through other ways than parliamentary penetration. But take other countries of the world. I would like to cite two or three cases there. Take the  situation.

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They have told us and told us perfectly openly in the 20th Party Congress proceedings that they propose to use this representation in order to subvert those government and that statement was made since all the anti-Stalin campaign has taken place.

I think that presents a very grave problem for us in many parts of the world.

I want to give a little description of the Communist apparatus which is the springboard both for their agent operation and agent penetration, and at a high level for giving the directives to the Communist Parties in various parts of the world. I brought along a lot of charts here, but they are probably too complicated to burden you with this morning. I can only state that the Communist apparatus really divides itself into two parts. There is the KGB, which is the organization that succeeded a long line of internal and external security organs that they have had in the Soviet Union that you first knew as the Cheka, then as the OGPU, then the NKGB and the NKVD, and then the MVD. The MVD finally was split in two, with the KGB, the organ of internal security, taking over the principal part.

I should not imagine that it would be a very desirable job to head this particular organization. The present head of it is Serov, who you probably recall recently visited England. I have the list here. The first head of the Chekov was Mr. Uritzkiy assassinated in 1918. One of his successors, Menzhinskiy, was suspected of being murdered in 1934. He was followed by Mr. Yagoda, executed in 1938. Mr. Yezhov followed him, and was executed in the latter part of that year. Abakumov, who followed, executed in 1951, and Beria was executed in 1954. (Laughter)

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(Discussion off the record)

MR. DULLES: As I have indicated, the present head of KGB is General Ivan Serov, Chairman of the Soviet State Security Board. General Serov was responsible for mass deportations in the early days, particularly from the Baltic areas. He is a tough fanatical Communist with rather a pleasing exterior. As I say, you will recall his recent visit to London.

In parallel with the KGB organization which I will describe a little further, the Russians have a military intelligence service known as the RU. The RU specializes in high level espionage penetrations in foreign countries. It has a very large organization.

Here is the general sketch of the RU organization (indicating). It has under General Staff and the Directorate for Intelligence, a school in a suburb of Moscow. It has a military diplomatic academy. It has a series of schools and institutes in various parts of the Soviet Union. It trains agents for foreign operations on a very large scale, and on a highly personalized basis. We have nothing comparable to it. Maybe we don't want it.

In training both on the side of RU, which is their military intelligence organization, and on the side of the KGB, which is both their internal and external subversive organization, the Russians have far exceeded anything which exists in the free world in terms of numbers of agents, numbers of schools, and the intensive nature of the training of persons in these schools. They go through years of training. They specialize in various languages of the various countries where they are going to operate. They are working particularly now, we believe, in training people for work in Latin America.

(Secretary Rothschild entered the room)

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MR. DULLES: I was just going into the question of training by the Soviet of their agent system, which is divided roughly into two main organizations. One is the RU, the military espionage organization. This gives specialized training for agents that are sent abroad very largely to get military or political information. And the other is the KGB, the state security organization, which deals largely with subversion. Both on the military side and on the civilian subversive side they have the series of schools that I have just described.

Here is a little chart that gives the organization of the KGB training set-up with General Serov at the top. Then they have a foreign intelligence directorate under another general because while this is in large part civilian, the training is also in part military. They have here a deep cover section. That is the section where the agents learn to take on the complexion and character of the countries where they are going to operate. There is a foreign language training section. The Russians are very good in languages. The Moscow Oriental Institute is where people are taught for work in Far Eastern countries.

There is a radio section where all the techniques of radio are taught. There is also a radio specialists school in Moscow. The Russians have another radio school in Yirgatz. They have a double agent school out in the Siberian area. They have a series of other schools there; and they have branches in various other parts of the Soviet Union, Moscow, Leningrad, and so forth.

The whole Soviet system was born in intrigue as a result of the long illegal activity during the old days of the Czar. So they started off with a hardened crew of people, born in the school of illegality. They have passed that on from father to son and from one instructor to another, and are



learned in these techniques in a way that we have never tried to emulate. I think you know we may have to do a good deal more.

I have been thinking of starting an institute which would at least start the study of what they are going. In my shop, and I know in the FBI and other agencies, we have training schools for our own people. We do put our people through a pretty careful course of training at an isolated location, where they are able to study and learn some of the techniques of the trade. But it is not a patch on what the Soviets do as far as intensity or as far as numbers are concerned. Believe me, there is no relaxation in this. They see new areas in the world where they feel they can exercise great influence.

I mentioned Africa and Latin America. I predict with a pretty firm assurance that these are two areas that they are going to have their eyes on, and that they are going to be training more and more people for operations in those particular areas.

So we have a very formidable opponent, and one that is not relaxing now as a result of anything that is happening in the Soviet Union, and one that I believe considers that their covert apparatus is right alongside their armed forces as one of the most potent elements they have in the overall international struggle as far as communism is concerned.

I want to turn to another phase of this topic that possibly would interest your committee. I wanted to go into some of the spy cases and analyze them from the point of view of security, because I am convinced that while we must do everything we can to protect the rights of the individual, I am firmly convinced that no one has a vested right to a job with the United States Government.

I am talking now of a person who is coming on board. Once you have been given a job, then you obviously have certain rights. But if you are applying for a job, you have no vested right to get that job unless you can meet the qualifications, not only of ability, but of security.

I see the Supreme Court has recently ruled with regard to sensitive and non-sensitive jobs. I am not going into that at the moment. We are interested, of course, particularly in those agencies that have sensitive jobs and where security information might leak to a potential enemy if there was any breach of loyalty.

If one analyzes four or five cases that I have mentioned here, for example, the McLean case, the Klaus Fuchs case, the John case, and the Richard Sorge case . . . . .

(Mr. McGranary entered the room)

(Discussion off the record)

MR. DULLES: Mr. McGranary, I have just gone over a little bit the present tactics of the Soviet Union, pointing out that there is no basic change in their overall policies, but a temporary change in techniques. I have gone over the training of their agents and what their training apparatus is. I was just taking up briefly certain typical espionage cases to see what one could learn from them. I had named the Burgess-McLean, Klaus Fuchs, Otto John and Richard Sorge cases. Probably all of those are somewhat familiar to you.

In the Burgess-McLean, the Klaus Fuchs and the Sorge cases, it is entirely clear now, from evidence I believe is generally available, that if there had been a security check at the time these people were employed or brought in, - the case of Sorge is a conspicuous example - no one of those four persons would ever have been allowed to have any security information.

I cite these cases because they probably did the free world more

harm than any other cases or certainly are typical of those cases where great harm was done to the free world. Burgess-McLean had a Communist background at Cambridge. As I say, if the full facts had been brought out, they would not have been hired. Under any present standards applied in this country or in England, or most of the other countries of the free world, I do not think they would have been taken on.

Take the Klaus Fuchs case. Klaus Fuchs had a communist background in Germany before he went to Britain. His family had been persecuted under Hitler. One can understand some of the background and some of the reasons for this. That communist background should have been known, and was available.

Sorge, who was probably the greatest international spy of the last war, operated, you may recall, in Japan and penetrated both the Germans and the Japanese for the Russians -- as I say probably the greatest spy the Russians ever had -- also had a communist background that should and could have been known.

So for those who pooh-pooh security regulations, I would just recommend that they make a study of these typical cases.

Let me say this. A definite communist background is something that is fairly easy to determine. There are facts in general. You may be an underground member of the Communist Party, and so far underground that you may not be discovered. In the cases I have cited this was not the situation. These were in open association.

Then there are other elements in the character of these men and in their development. In three of these cases, not the Sorge case, but the McLean, Fuchs and John cases, there was a measure of frustration, particularly in the Burgess-McLean case. These men started on their career of espionage, and then

not so much because of that, but because of their character failings, they began to reach the limit of their capabilities in the particular profession that they were following. They made grievous errors in the diplomatic field, errors of character, and finally reached a point where they felt there was no return, and they either defected or became full fledged Communist agents.

In the case of Richard Sorge, it was a question largely of money, partly of ideological background, and he also became fascinated with the job. If one wants an exciting life, I have never been one, but I imagine being a spy fulfills your satisfaction. Some people do it just for the excitement.

With Otto John, it was also a case of frustration. He, too, was failing in his tasks and desired to satisfy his ego. We find in many of these cases that it is the unsatisfied ego that leads to espionage. It is a hard thing to detect.

I did not mean to take quite so much time on these particular cases, but I thought that background might be of some interest to you.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: Might I interject a question there, Mr. Dulles?

MR. DULLES: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: I am advised that the Chief Executive, at the time of the Manhattan Project, not only did not request checking from the FBI, but issued orders that there should be no check. Anything that we evolve in our studies will necessarily, will it not, have to be an ironclad law, so that it is not within the purview of any executive to ignore it. Discretion in this kind of thing often undoes the picture. Is that not a good illustration?

MR. DULLES: I don't know the background facts on that, Mr. Chairman, and under my charter I am more or less precluded from dealing with internal security matters. I don't know that I am competent to give you more than the

experience that I have had in my own shop, and in dealing with Communist infiltration. I think you are much wiser than I in knowing how to meet it.

It is very hard, though, to put down absolutely rigid rules. Maybe you can write a law or draft of a law that would do this.

MR. McGRANERY: You mean that would limit the powers of the President?

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: No, make it compulsory that an examination or investigation be made. That is all I was thinking, not to limit anything.

MR. McGRANERY: That the Chief Executive cannot exempt himself from.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: That is a question that we have to face, as I see it.

MR. McGRANERY: I think you might make such a recommendation, but you have to change the Constitution if you want to do that. That would be quite a question to get into here, whether or not we could limit the powers of the President. Article II says that the executive powers reside in the President, period.

SENATOR COTTON: We fixed it so he cannot appoint a postmaster if there is a serviceman who passes an examination and gets a higher rate than one who has not served in the Armed Services. The President cannot appoint him.

MR. McGRANERY: I hope you are not trying to make an analogy of that, Senator.

SENATOR COTTON: If you can make an ironclad rule for the requirements for a postmaster, you can make an ironclad rule for a security examination.

MR. McGRANERY: I suppose under your theory if an enemy fleet was advancing on Fortress Monroe, we could make a law to say that the President has no right or authority without the consent of Congress to send our Navy to defeat it. That is what we will get into.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: In view of the fact that Mr. Dulles has to leave, perhaps we might permit him to continue, and we will argue our few points afterwards.

MR. McGRANERY: I think those things could well be left out.

MR. DULLES: Turning back just for a moment to the Communist procedures, they operate not only through these two organizations that I have mentioned, which are under very direct and close Kremlin control, that is, the KGB and the military intelligence organization, the RU, but they also operate through a whole series of front organizations that are not as easy sometimes to identify as the direct Communist penetration, because they are shrouded with high sounding names, with high objectives, and often operate from countries outside the Soviet Union. It is one of the major parts of their apparatus and one of the most subtle.

Here is a brief list of them. The 15 most important ones are in a little booklet here.

The World Peace Council. You may recall that name. It was largely a propaganda organization that had great effect in the world with the Stockholm Peace Appeal, and so forth.

The World Federation of Trade Unions. This is one of the most dangerous elements of the Soviet penetration, which has the task of penetrating the trade unions. They control the major trade unions of France and Italy, and have very strong trade unions in Japan and other countries of the world.

The WFTU is a very powerful organization. It is trying to find a new headquarters location. It was in the Soviet Zone of Vienna. They are trying to locate it somewhere else from which to carry on its activities.

They don't like to have it entirely behind the Iron Curtain, because then it is too much identified with Moscow.

They have the World Federation of Democratic Youth. It is a large organization which has great rallies in other parts of the world. They have the International Union of Students, Women's International Democratic Federation, International Federation of Resistance Fighters, International Association of Democratic Lawyers. You probably have heard of that. (Laughter).

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: I came darn near joining it before I knew what it was.

MR. DULLES: I am just quoting here. (Laughter).

The World Federation of Scientific Workers, the World Federation of Teachers Unions, the Committee for The Promotion of International Trade, the World Congress of Doctors, International Organization of Journalists, International Broadcasting organization.

Those are a few of the major ones, and they put millions and millions of dollars into those organizations and they operate pretty much on a worldwide basis. They fool a lot of people and get a lot of good names, and are doing a great deal of harm.

Here I think our best weapon is publicity. We are trying to assure that these particular organizations get well publicized so that people will know what they are. As we know, at one time the Russians operated through the Comintern which, allegedly to please us, they abolished in 1943. Then they organized the Cominform shortly after the war. That, as a part of their present peace maneuver, they have now abolished. It did not serve any further useful purpose. It had become over advertised.

I think if we can over-advertise some of their other organizations they will find they will have to change them around and invent new names.

They are making more headway in other countries, where as I pointed out they have large Communist Parties as a kind of nucleus, or umbrella from which they can operate. They are particularly effective in the new areas of the world and the ex-colonial areas, where they see that the Soviet Union in a relatively short time, as they see it, has become the second great power of the world, from having been pretty flat on its back 30 or 40 years ago. That has made a great impact on the whole colonial area. They are following up in the colonial area not only with their subversive organizations, but with large scale offers of aid and trade, and it faces us all over that area of the world, the soft under-belly of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia, and Asia, and the Middle East, with very grave problems.

We have a situation where in my opinion it is no time to relax proper security measures to see that our own government organization is as free from any Communist taint as laws and regulations can possible make it within the proper protection of the rights of the individual on which this country was founded.

It is a great pleasure to have this opportunity to be with you. If there are any further points you want me to follow up or on which you would like to have further information either in written or oral form, I would be very glad to present it to this committee.



CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: Thank you very much.

May I ask one or two questions? Have you run across any evidence that these visiting teams from Russia generally have a very good operator with them?

MR. DULLES: That would be a question that Mr. Hoover could answer better than I, but it is our impression that they always do have one or more operators that are taken either from these two organizations, the KGB or the RU.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: I am satisfied that Mr. Hoover feels that is the case.

How about the United Nations group, Mr. Dulles? Are we adequately protected there, do you think?

MR. DULLES: That is a little out of my field. We try really to keep our jurisdiction pretty separate. That is in the field of the Bureau rather than CIA. When Congress passed the law setting up CIA, they said I should not have any internal security functions, and I am pretty scrupulous in sticking to my own shop.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: As a citizen and if you were on this Commission, would you feel compelled to take a look at that situation? (Laughter)

MR. DULLES: I think, Mr. Chairman, that I can hardly divorce my official position.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: I am sure you can answer this question. In the western hemisphere they are operating mostly

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out of Mexico, are they not?

MR. DULLES: Mexico is one of their main centers. They are endeavoring to operate to some extent out of Havana, although they are banned there. The government is much more vigorous there than it is in Mexico. They have a pretty good headquarters in Rio. Those are the three main centers for this hemisphere.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: You mentioned these schools in Russia and in other countries. We used to have the honor in California of having a couple of them. Have you any reason to believe that they are not still going on in the United States?

MR. DULLES: Communist schools?

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: Yes, sir.

MR. DULLES: There again you get me into a position where Mr. Hoover can answer very much better than I. I would doubt whether there were any schools functioning. If we knew of them, I imagine they would be stopped. Would they not, Mickey?

MR. LADD: Some of them are under investigation, and I think have been referred to the Subversive Activities Control Board.

MR. DULLES: There are probably some schools in this country that are fairly well infiltrated.

DR. MURPHY: Mr. Dulles, it is my understanding

indirectly that in Geneva last year at the so-called International Atomic Conference, or whatever it was entitled, the Russians expressed themselves scientifically with perhaps more candor than had been anticipated. One gets the impression, for example, when Bulganin and Khrushchev came to England, they brought along one of their atom people who made a speech at the atomic energy installation. He spoke with amazing candor. At least one got that impression from the press.

Is there any significance in the fact that these Russians seem to be communicating more than in yesteryear their scientific knowledge, and what is the significance? Should we be concerned about it one way or the other?

MR. DULLES: Yes, I think you are quite right. They have been expressing themselves in recent scientific conferences, including that at Geneva, and including one that is going on now, I believe in Switzerland, with a good deal more candor than in the past. Their publications contain a good deal more than they used to. Occasionally, yes, we are getting some new information. I think that they feel that in the atomic age it is of great importance for them not necessarily to impress the United States, but to impress all the uncommitted countries that they are a leader in this new field. If, for example, we were the only ones that were talking, we were the only ones that were doing things,

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we were the only ones that were producing nuclear reactors, we would have a great advantage over them. A lot of countries, particularly where electric power is very backward, are expecting miracles to happen tomorrow. They are not going to happen tomorrow because you can't turn nuclear energy into power as quickly as that. But it is one of the most appealing arguments to the uncommitted world.

Therefore, I think at Geneva, they were not talking so much to the Americans; they were talking to the Indians and Burmese and these other people, and trying to say that, "we are the country in this nuclear field that will be able to give you what you want if you come to us".

I think it is very largely on that account, and knowing that they probably were not giving us any secrets that amounted to very much.

Then there are scientists all over the world who have a sort of proclivity, once they get talking in their scientific fields, there is no restraint on them. It is very hard for them to tell where the border of security and non security information is. That is natural.

DR. MURPHY: Would it be an unfair question to ask you whether you thought it was desirable or undesirable that scientific teams and indeed scholars of all sorts from this country of ours should be permitted to go at greater freedom to Russia, if it were possible? That is, if the

Russians permitted it.

MR. DULLES: Looking at it as an Intelligence Officer, my answer to that question would be "Yes." I think it would be desirable, because the United States being a very large and open book in very many fields, they know far more about us than we know about them. If, as a result of this interchange, we were able to broaden our knowledge, that would probably be of more advantage to us than to them. We are very anxious to know where they stand in the atomic energy field. It is important to us in other fields, such as long-range bombers, guided missiles, regarding which we want more information. They know a good deal about where we are. We do not know as much as we would like to know about where they are. Therefore, as an Intelligence Officer, I am rather glad to see these exchanges continued.

But I think after a short time we will have to carefully examine whether we are being taken for a ride or whether we are being taken to places where we are increasing our knowledge. There is no use for mission after mission to go over the same general field and learn the same things, a good many of which we know. If they can get some new knowledge, it will be very important to us.

I think the whole program should be re-examined after a period of six months or a year to see who is gaining by it.

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SENATOR COTTON: Mr. Dulles, I have one question

which I am fairly confident that you would be willing to answer. You are reasonably familiar with the creation of this Commission and the purposes of this Commission.

MR. DULLES: Yes, sir.

SENATOR COTTON: What would be your advice or suggestion, if you would be willing to make it, as to the extent and the fields into which this Commission should venture in their examination? Should it be confined to methods of preserving security in employees of Government? Should it be confined to that plus methods of security in private industry that had contracts with the Government? Should it be extended to the field of espionage? Should it be extended to examination of private institutions, both industrial and educational throughout the country? What would be your offhand, off the cuff, feeling about the most effective field or fields in which this Commission ought to operate and how wide should be the scope of its inquiry?

MR. DULLES: That is not a very easy question. I have not studied your terms of reference under the law as carefully as I should have, possibly, before coming here this morning.

SENATOR COTTON: Forgetting that for a moment, primarily we are created by Congress and appointed by the President and Vice President and Speaker of the House to

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examine and to correlate and to coordinate and to report

suggestions about how we can improve security. As a practical matter, we could dissipate our endeavors over a wide field or we can concentrate them. I was just wondering, as one who is spending so much time on this subject, if you can give us an opinion, recognizing it is just an off-hand opinion.

MR. DULLES: I would feel that you could do a very great service, if in this field of security and Government employment you could work out a system or make suggestions which would insure the rights of the individual and the security of the United States. That is a very broad question. There has been over quite a long period some uncertainty in this field, and various efforts have been made to try to meet it. Maybe there is nothing more satisfactory than exists at the present time.

I think it is very important that the loyal employee of the Government should feel a complete security as long as he maintains loyalty and is secure in his job, should be assured of a full hearing if any question ever arises; and that we find the very best method of marrying the absolute necessity to maintain Government security with the equal necessity of being able to get the highest type individuals to serve the Government without fear that one would be subjected to questioning because of frivolous or unfounded charges. It is a very difficult thing to do.

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SENATOR COTTON: That is suggested in the Act which creates us. I understand from your reply that you feel that the most important contribution -- and I think perhaps we all agree with that -- is to deliberate and recommend to the Congress a good system of security for those employed by the Government. What I was seeking was this: Would you care to indicate in what other fields, if any, for the public good, that you think this Commission ought to inquire. How far should we go? Should we confine ourselves to loyalty in Government or should we go into the matter of defending the country from subversion?

MR. DULLES: I am inclined to think that the latter field would be a very difficult one for any Commission to get into, unless the law-enforcing agencies in this country should come before you, as probably they could, and indicate to you that they felt that there were gaps either in the law or in procedures which limited their work in protecting this country. It is possible that could be done. I am sure you will be hearing Mr. Hoover, I assume you will -- I do not know. I am not sure what your procedures are.

If there were recommendations that any of the internal security agencies of the country could make, if it was in your scope, and you could tighten up on that and help them, that would be a real help in the whole security field.



There is one point I might raise and this is a very delicate one and I know the Department of Justice has worked on it. I have never felt that we have an adequate Government secrets act. There you get to a very difficult problem. You are likely to have the press against you if you do anything. Probably you did in your time, sir, and the Department of Justice, I know, has from time to time looked into that. But the facts are that I do not think we have as effective laws in this field as the British or the Canadians do.

They had a very good procedure, I think in both the Canadian and Australian spy cases in setting up these special commissions and they were handled in an extremely effective fashion. But, as I understand it they had pretty effective legislation under which to act.

We have great difficulty in security cases that have to come up before the courts, because in so many cases you have to prove intent. It is very difficult to prove it in many cases. I do not know whether you can go into that. It is a very, very difficult problem.

We have had a number of security cases where there was not any doubt as to what had happened. The documents had been passed. They had been passed to the detriment of the United States. But could you prove that the fellow intended to harm the United States? That is a hard question to prove. We have been hindered in our security work.

Take a case like the [ ] that came up recently, one of the most important that has come up since I have been here in Washington. That case, if some of the participants could explain it to you -- the Department of Justice could give you a rundown on the case -- would be a very good example.

25X1

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: We have some others.

MR. DULLES: There are some others. We are not well heeled.

MR. McGRANEY: You could reopen the [ ]

25X1

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: Mr. Dulles, our mandate from Congress is to cover the whole field. In this atomic age, it seems to me that anything less is dangerous because what is not sensitive today might become sensitive over night. That is why in my interpretation of the Act, unless they change it, we are compelled to go into every facet. I want to say to the Commission that Mr. Dulles has given us every conceivable and possible assistance. Ever since I first talked to him, any requests we have made he has complied with. We are most appreciative. I would like, Mr. Dulles, if we may at some subsequent meeting, have you back with a little more specific questions as we develop our program, because we need your assistance.

MR. DULLES: It will be a great pleasure to do it. It is a very important job you have taken on. We will certainly

back you. I think I will take your statute with me and I will study it on the plane. I will have time to study it.

MR. McGRANERY: Could I ask Mr. Dulles just one question before he takes his leave?

I have read, Mr. Dulles, this report of the New York County Bar Association. It is a draft. It is now drafted in final form, however. I suppose somebody over in your shop has already briefed it.

MR. DULLES: I have not seen it.

MR. McGRANERY: I wish you would have somebody brief it for you.

MR. DULLES: I appeared before that committee and spent an evening with them.

MR. McGRANERY: I know you did. There are some comments there that I am sure would deserve your attention and you would want to give your attention to. So if you could do that and let us know, either by letter or otherwise, your comment, if you care to make such, with respect to the recommendations made in connection with what affects your shop in that report, I think we would want to give it attention.

MR. DULLES: There is no reason why I should not do it. I will take that on. I knew the report was finished.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: So far as I know, we and the

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Attorney General are the only ones that have received it.

MR. McGRANERY: You can be sure that Mr. Dulles has a copy, too.

MR. DULLES: We will get one, too. Thank you very much, sir.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: Thank you, sir.

(Mr. Dulles departed.)

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: Ladies and gentleman, General Carroll is here. The Secretary has asked him to come. As far as I can ascertain, he is generally conceded to be the outstanding man in the Services in this field.

General, in order that you may know whom you are addressing, I will introduce you to those present.

(Introduction.)

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: We would like to have you in your own way tell us the things that you think we ought to know and do.

GENERAL CARROLL: Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this Commission, as I understand it, I am being privileged to talk to you about our security problem.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: May I ask you this: Have you any objection that it be written up so those who are here may see it?

GENERAL CARROLL: None whatsoever.

CHAIRMAN WRIGHT: No one else will look at it, of